Issue #287

Monday · November 16, 2026

๐Ÿฅ– Palate Cleanser

Thanks, everyone, for all the kind words and support on last week's Top 10 AWS Security Research announcement. In case you missed it, you can watch the discussion or read the full list.

Cognito got some really nice improvements. With token exchange, a service or AI agent acting for a user can swap the user's token for a narrower one that only works with one downstream service, instead of the broad original. With session management, you can list a user's active sessions across all their devices and apps and revoke any of them - I wonder what the lag is on enforcement.

Cloud Village posted its DEF CON 34 labs this week, including Breaking AWS Bedrock: Novel Attack Techniques Against Cloud Infrastructure and Agentic Cloud Hacking: Solving CTFs with AI.

Finally, in this week's episode of wild things people tell me: "AI is eliminating software vulnerabilities." Ummm... Also this week, AWS API MCP Server turned operation names into CLI commands with re.sub('([A-Z])', r'-\1', operation).lower().lstrip('-') before checking them against a deny list. That worked fine for DeleteBucket โ†’ delete-bucket but not so fine for DeactivateMFADevice โ†’ deactivate-m-f-a-device. State-of-the-art vulnerability eliminated.

Sponsor shoutout Plerion

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๐Ÿ“‹ Chef's selections

Trusted by Default: Qubole Cross-Account Access Abused in the Wild

by Zack Morrow, Sean Johnstone and Benjamin Read

As someone who works for a cloud vendor, this is my nightmare. Qubole is a big data platform. It accesses customer AWS accounts through roles with trust relationships to Qubole's AWS account. An attacker got hold of access keys for two IAM users in Qubole's account and assumed a bunch of customer roles. Most of the customer roles were otherwise unused during October. Some were even no longer required and just weren't deprovisioned. The attacker rummaged through Lambda environment variables, Secrets Manager and SSM parameters, and downloaded whole S3 buckets. More details here.

On the hunt for ARTEX: understanding agentic attacks in AWS environments

by Julie Agnes Sparks

The level of exasperation around autonomous hacking agents has been steadily increasing over the last few months. Stuff like this is why. ARTEX is an AI pentest framework where an operator names a target and a team of LLM agents plans and runs an attack. It passed 12,000 forks on GitHub before going closed-source in October. An English-translated open-source copy lives on. Julie got to see it being used in the wild, including inside AWS environments. With a leaked access key, it searched CloudWatch for hedge funds and crypto firms, probably at an operator's direction. Without keys, it signed itself up to a public Cognito user pool, swapped its tokens for AWS credentials and tried nearly every read-only call it could, all denied. Helpfully, it had a tendency to use user agents like artex-pentest/1.0.

AWS also saw ARTEX at work. It runs honeypots called MadPot, and some of them pretend to be LLM APIs. Attack agents that AWS believes ran on ARTEX sent their requests there. Each request included the agent's memory, which often had the whole campaign, so AWS could read what the attackers were up to. For example, one group was trying to beat crypto exchanges' live selfie checks with a deepfake.

How to set up IAM Roles Anywhere automatic certificate revocation checking

by Paul Schwarzenberger

Paul's obsession with certificates continues. IAM Roles Anywhere mints AWS credentials for workloads outside AWS that hold an X.509 certificate. It can now check revocation on its own by fetching the certificate revocation list (CRL) from the distribution point named in the certificate, so no more scripted CRL uploads to the trust anchor. Paul walks through it end to end with his open-source serverless CA.

๐Ÿฅ— AWS security blogs

๐Ÿ› Reddit threads on r/aws


๐Ÿค– Dessert

Every machine-tracked change this week. Nobody else assembles this.

๐Ÿง IAM permission changes

๐Ÿช API changes

๐Ÿน IAM managed policy changes

โ˜• CloudFormation resource changes

No resource updates this week.

๐Ÿ“บ AWS security bulletins

๐Ÿšฌ Security documentation changes

๐ŸŽฎ Amazon Linux vulnerabilities

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